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In the South African context, the question of ethnicity is a morally-
charged and difficult one. This is mainly so, of course, because the
enforcement of ethnic separation by the S A Government has been seen to
lie at the heart of some of Apartheid1s worst atrocities. The study of
ethnic identities, by volkekundiges, for example (see Sharp 1980), has
appeared as an unquestioning acceptance - or even an ideological justi-
fying - by academics of this official policy. Because of this, scholars
critical of state policy have tended to underemphasise these identities,
and to stress instead uniting factors such as a common working-class
identity. In recent years, however, a number of studies have singled out
for analysis precisely this kind of strong group identification (see for
example Clegg 1981; Marks 1986; Erlmann 1987). While these works do ac-
knowledge that the outer parameters within which strong ethnicity emerges
have been set by state policy, they are equally concerned to examine the
local-level processes through which it develops and is maintained. They
also have in common an insistence that these group identities must be
understood not in terms of primordial loyalties, but as affiliations es-
tablished by specific, and recent, historical developments.
Pursuing a similar line of argument, I look in this paper at deep-seated
ethnic divisions between Pedi and Ndebele in a Lebowa village. An
understanding of these requires both a knowledge of the present con-
straints on resources and political power in the Homeland context, and
an awareness of the two groups' recent histories which have led them, in
some measure, to constitute themselves as ethnic groups in the contempo-
rary situation. A body of literature in anthropology and history proves
useful in stressing the point that ethnicity must be understood as some-
thing newly-invented or revitalised rather than as something which has
tenaciously survived from the past.
Morotse is a village situated on the peripheries of Lebowa, on one of a
group of "Trust farms" which were bought from white owners after 1936 to
add to the existing Homeland area. Almost all the village's present in-
habitants - Pedi and Ndebele - moved to their present home since the 1930s
from the white farms of the southeastern Transvaal where they lived as
tenants.
Administratively, although the village is part of the official Pedi
Homeland of Lebowa, it is presided over by an Ndzundza Ndebele chief,
Mphezulu Jack Mahlangu, and is part of the Mahlangu Tribal Area which
takes its name from this chief's family. To understand this apparent
anomaly one must look, again, at the history of the area's populating by
labour tenants. Among the people that settled here during the 1930s was
a group of Ndzundza Ndebele under their chief, a predecessor and grand-
father of the present incumbent. By the time an official head of the
Tribal Authority in the area came to be appointed, in 1957, there had been
no recognition by the South African Government of the Ndebele as a group
to which land or political status would be allocated within the Homeland
system. It was in this way that the leader of the Nebo Ndebele - as the
group is often called, taking its name from the magisterial district of
Lebowa where it resides - came to occupy the position of chief in the
area, under the rubric of the Lebowa Government.
In later years, as is now well known, a Homeland did come to be designated
for the Ndebele. Its creation was prompted by the continued departure
from white farms of labour tenants who were now too many to be accommo-
Figure 1: Map of northern Middelburg district; southern Nebo
distr ict, Lebowa; and KwaNdebele (including Moutse I and II)
dated alongside other groups of people in the various other Homelands.
A tense and antagonistic relationship developed between the leaders of
the Ndebele who eventually opted for Homeland status in this newly-
allotted territory of KwaNdebele, and the leaders of the Nebo Ndebele who
were adamant that they would never accept any territory remote from the
original Ndebele heartland, now known as Mapochsgronde.1 The split be-
tween these two branches of the chiefly Mahlangu family and their re-
spective groups of followers forms an important background to the lives
of Nebo Ndebele living in Morotse, as will later be demonstrated.
Against this background, we may look at local-level relationships between
members of the two groups in Morotse. The spatial division of the village
into Pedi and Ndebele sections which I observed during fieldwork extended
into, and was reinforced by, many aspects of village life beyond the
purely geographical. Some differences between the two communities were
commented-on by villagers and enshrined in ethnic stereotypes and
categorisations, but other abstract, structural differences were more
clearly visible to me, an outsider.
On the level of folk interpretation, Pedi people revealed in conversation
that they thought the Ndebele to be old-fashioned, with excessive respect
for traditional authority, and mostly pagan in their beliefs. Ndebele,
For more detail on the split between these two groups, see James
(1987: 22-3, 44-61). The account is based on two strongly con-
trasting sources. One, by Coetzee (1980), attributes the split to
tendencies of fission inherent in the tribe's social organisation and
to succession disputes during the 19th century. It follows that the
one "rightful" Ndzundza chief can be identified through a careful
application of tribal traditions, and that an Ndebele nationalism and
pride in ethnic unity can thereby be fostered, thus healing the split.
The other source is a set of oral traditions originating in the
chiefly family of the Nebo Ndzundza. According to these, the split
was caused by S A Government legislation during the 20th. century.
Given that the Ndebele were refused permission to settle in their
original heartland, leaders from each group accused the other of
having capitulated by accepting alternative land for settlement: one
in Lebowa, and the other - eventually - in KwaNdebele. The bitterness
later increased and assumed its most violent dimensions over the issue
of whether the Ndebele should accept independence in their new Home-
land.
on the other hand, thought the Pedi were fierce and angry, and too prone
to create trouble with the whites or with any other form of authority.
These reciprocal ethnic stereotypes acquired their most stark form during
an incident of protest in which the chief's authority was, momentarily,
fundamentally challenged. Villagers had united to speak out against a
so-called Co-op, which had for several years controlled their farming in
an authoritarian manner, and in which the chief played an important
guiding' role. When the chief addressed them and implored them to abandon
their protest, some villagers agreed to do so while others wished to carry
their action still further. The division between "capitulators" and
"resisters" was thought by many - on both sides of the ethnic divide -
to be synonymous with that between Ndebele and Pedi.
The more etic differences, observable on the level of social structure,
in many instances bore out the emic image of Pedi Christian modernity
contrasted with Ndebele traditionalism. The typical Ndebele household,
for example, was extended along agnatic lines, with a man and several sons
- or, more accurately, a woman and several daughters-in-law - living to-
gether and sharing resources. In contrast, Pedi households in the village
were generally smaller or, where a household was extended, it was most
often through its unmarried daughters and their children.2 The logic of
these differing household structures was evident, too, in the way in which
the rule of last-born inheritance - equally tenaciously clung-to in theory
by both Pedi and Ndebele - was carried out by members of the two groups.
In Pedi families it was more common for the older sons to move away from
the parental home, leaving the younger son to take care of his parents,
to set up home on their plot, and use their fields. Ndebele families,
so strongly united by agnatic ties, failed to undergo the fission which
normally occurs with impartible inheritance. Instead, the family would
2
 See James (1985) for a more subtle account of this rather crudely-
drawn contrast.
stick together and continue to use the field jointly.3 In line with these
structural differences, the role played by women in domestic and village
life differed strikingly between the two communities, with Ndebele women
more apparently "traditionalist", subject to stricter rules of hlonipha,
and more often dwelling in orthodox households with their in-laws where
such rules would have to be observed.
Within the broad context of the division between the two groups, it can
be seen •• from this brief description that the Ndzundza group is more
"ethnic" than the Pedi: that is, it is seen and sees itself as more cul-
turally distinctive, and its members are subjected to cultural stere-
otyping by the "outgroup" more frequently than they, in turn, construct
stereotypes about the members of this outgroup. A framework for under-
standing these strongly-marked divisions, and the particularly noticeable
ethnicity of the Ndebele, is provided by some writing in history and
anthropology from the last two decades.
Ethnicity in the Literature
The collection of writings I will refer to here has developed a critical
stance towards the "conventional wisdom" on ethnicity. Briefly, the
structural-functionalist approach in anthropology presumed tribes to be
logically bounded units, each with an organically patterned and coherent
social system. When adherence to these tribal systems or cultures was
in evidence in a modern, postcolonial context, this was seen by
modernisation theorists as an anachronistic and irrational persistence
of tradition (see Kahn 1981:49). The alternative interpretation
emphasises that, even if the cultural practices and symbols used to
emphasise ethnicity are apparently primordial, they are invoked for rea-
sons deriving from the contemporary political and economic situation.
See James (1988, in press) for more details.
Such a view was presaged by Mitchell (1956), who shows that the signif-
icance of tribal membership in the urban setting is of a completely dif-
ferent order from that of belonging to a tribe in a rural area. In the
urban context, "tribe" provides a way of interacting with and a system
of social categorisation for strangers never previously encountered
{ibid.:30). Indeed, even the symbols used by Copperbelt workers to denote
tribal membership are not primordial or imbued with apparent tradition
as one might expect: the Kalela dancers wear western outfits such as
doctors' and nurses' uniforms.
Subsequent writings lay a similar stress on the contemporary dimension.
Leys (1975), writing on underdevelopment in Kenya, espouses the radical
view that tribalism, far from having any roots at all in precolonial so-
ciety, is the child exclusively of colonialism and of capitalist processes
of production and exploitation. The real divisions that developed between
people in the post-colonial era in Kenya, he says, were those of socio-
economic class, and where tribal divisions were stressed these served,
either to express the materially grounded class interests, or, at times,
to disguise these class interests by providing links between people whose
material interests were in fact radically opposed.1*
In support of the first claim Leys cites the example of ethnic con-
flict between the Luo and the Kikuyu in the era immediately following
the departure of the colonial authorities from Kenya. It was because
the Kikuyu had an especially early experience of underdevelopment and
were soon integrated into the capitalist economy, he claims, that many
of them in turn took early advantage of opportunities for land pur-
chase and the possibilities of accumulating capital, and so began to
constitute a bourgeoisie (1975:199). Here, "tribe" was equivalent
to "class", but in other cases the call of "tribe" served to blind
people to their class interests. This happened through the formation
of patron-client relationships, in which - to refer again to the above
example - members of the Kikuyu tribe who had not acquired bourgeois
status attached themselves to middle-class Kikuyu patrons, hoping for
help from them in finding jobs, while the patrons in turn need sub-
stantial mass support in their quest to acquire business licences,
contracts and the like {ibid. :203). The ties of "Kikuyu-ness" thus
cut across ties which might have united the mass of peasants and/or
workers against the new African elites which exploited them. For
another analysis of ethnicity in class terms, see van Onselen and
Phimister (1978).
A related body of writing suggests that, not only did tribes become sig-
nificant categories of interaction post-colonially due to the
juxtaposition of and competition between hitherto remote peoples, but
that particular groupings were only constituted as "tribes" at all as a
result of colonial processes. Thus, Ranger (1984) and Gulliver (1969:13)
show how missionaries, keen to find a medium for prosetylising, would
identify a tribe and its area with a particular language, while
anthropologists aligned it with cultural traits and artefacts. But even
more important than these processes was the way in which groups were
designated and reinforced - or even quite newly created - by the system
of colonial administration (Iliffe 1979:329-30). A tribe became identi-
fied with an area, a system of courts, and a definite leader whose rule
was reinforced by the colonial authorities (Gulliver 1969:13).
Here, political identity and awareness of tribal membership are insepa-
rable, having been rigidly imposed from above by the colonial authorities.
In contrast, Cohen's book on Hausa traders living in the Yoruba town of
Ibadan (1969) looks at informal, grass-roots political activity - also
expressed through ethnic affiliation - which occurred only in the
postcolonial era after the end of indirect rule. Within the formally-
structured political state system, small groups emerged which defined
themselves in cultural "ethnic" terms, but which served primarily to
maintain their members' hold over scarce resources, and were therefore
political in nature. In the case he describes, Hausa traders in Ibadan
have developed an ethnic exclusiveness, expressed mostly via Islamic
mysticism, which distinguishes them from the indigenous Yoruba popu-
lation. Cohen claims that this is not merely an attempt to "make a
statement" about cultural distinctiveness in a foreign situation, but is
rather a way of enabling these traders to maintain strong group identity
and thereby to establish a monopoly over the region's long-distance trade
in certain commodities {ibid.:188-90).
Like Mitchell, Cohen stresses that this ethnicity does not merely repre-
sent a survival of tenaciously held-to traditional practices. The man-
ifestation of "Hausa-ness" among Ibadan Hausa traders bears little
resemblance to the behaviour of Hausa still living in their heartland
{ibid.:15). The former cannot, then, be assumed to be a conservation of
the latter, but rather involves a dynamic rearrangement of customs and
relationships (ibid.:198).
In this- stress on the newness of ethnicity's significance, Cohen's ap-
proach also resembles that of Marxist and underdevelopment theorists such
as Leys. Unlike these writers, however, he is not concerned to demon-
strate a necessary link between the phenomenon of ethnicity - or what he
calls "retribalisation" (_ibid.:l) - and capitalism. His emphasis, which
could be applied in capitalist or non-capitalist situations, is on the
way in which groups in competition with each other endeavour to safeguard
their own political and economic interests.
Cohen resembles Marxist writers, too, in viewing ethnicity as a mask for
other underlying relationships: for the Marxists, these are class re-
lationships, while for Cohen they are political in nature. But he dem-
onstrates in a much more thorough and detailed way than most of the
Marxist writers the bridging of the gap between ethnic symbolism (the
"language") and political organisation (the thing expressed). He shows
firstly how, through myths of origin and of superiority, through shared
and strongly adhered-to cultural features, and through the accompanying
practice of co-residence and endogamy, a group acquires distinctiveness.
Given this, aspects of informal political organisation - such as
decision-making, the exercise of authority and discipline, and the pres-
ence of a strong ideology - may be provided by means, say, of kinship (a
commonly occurring manifestation of ethnicity) but even more frequently
by means of ritual, with its rules, its personnel, its frequent meetings
and its all-pervasive sense of moral coercion. In this way, a group such
as a separatist church, or an Islamic mystical movement, may provide the
organisational and ideological vehicle for informal political activity
(ibid.:202-11).
In an article published at about the same time, La Fontaine discusses
tribalism among the Gisu of Uganda (1969), and makes some similar obser-
vations about the latent political functions of a group's adherence to
apparently cultural, tribal traits. The growth of Gisu tribalist con-
sciousness in the colonial era involved various cultural elements, but
most important of these was male initiation, since it equipped a youth
to enter the adult world in which political power could be exercised.
As with the Hausa, a grouping which defined itself primarily in moral,
ritual terms was functioning, albeit informally, on a political level.
Initiation was the membership badge of a political grouping.
Apart from this central concern of her article, Fontaine has an additional
preoccupation - shared by a different group of anthropological writers
on tribalism - with the question of how one may accurately define a tribe.
Somewhat puzzlingly, despite her insistence that a ritual, cultural
grouping defines a political one, she is still concerned to answer the
question of which of these factors - cultural homogeneity, or allegiance
to a political authority - should be used to identify a tribe
(ibid. : 178-80) .5 The question can be answered by looking at the work of
Barth (1969), who shows that the important question to ask in studies of
ethnicity is not what features characterise a tribe, but why it is con-
5
 When, fairly recently, anthropologists began to be aware of such
questions of definition, there were some serious attempts to enumer-
ate a set of criteria for measuring where one tribe ended and another
began: Naroll, for example, listed "trait distributions, territorial
contiguity, political organisation, language, ecological adjustment,
and local community structure" (1964, cited by Moermann 1965:1215).
But quite apart from the difficulties involved in determining dis-
continuities in each of these criteria independently, there is the
more fundamental problem that their limits or boundaries do not nec-
essarily coincide with each other. So, for instance, a political unit
may encompass two distinct language areas, or several different areas
of trait distribution.
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cerned to maintain itself as so strongly distinct from other groups. His
emphasis is on the dynamic process whereby a group maintains its own
boundaries rather than on a static, morphological enumeration of the
group's cultural features {ibid.:10). He is interested in the folk de-
finition: in those differences which actors themselves - both within and
outside the group - regard as important in marking themselves off as
distinct from other people (ibid.i
The emphasis on. understanding how and why boundaries are so strongly
maintained provides a unifying device, allowing for the incorporation of
many of the other elements of ethnicity mentioned so far. The resulting
eclectic model utilises the strengths of the various approaches, thus
providing an escape from the limitations of a monocausal explanation.
The composite argument might be summarised as follows. A group of people
is thrown into a situation in which it is forced to compete with another,
or with several other, groups, for resources which have become scarce.
This is most common - but does not occur only - in a post-colonial situ-
ation, and it may be heightened by the fact that most members of the group
have been incorporated into a capitalist economy as members of a distinct
class, whose interests are thus opposed to those of another such
class/group. Where the group alignment overlaps with or incorporates
membership of other classes, this may be disguised by an emphasis on the
importance of the group and its origins, and a denial of the importance
of its precise class composition. In the process of interacting with
various other groups in the social field, the group may come to be defined
in terms of particular cultural traits. The defining may be done by
members of the group itself - "I am an X because I have been initiated
by X rituals" - or, in negative or positive terms, by members of another
group with which it is competing for socio-political resources - "The X
always behave with great respect to their in-laws", or "The X are very
backward and primitive". A definition may also be elaborated by members
of a ruling group which has its own interests in, or has evolved its own
11
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way of, attributing particular features to the group - "The X occupy this
region, speak this language, and we will place them under such and such
a ruler for the purposes of administration". Similarly, those who act
most often as employers of the group's members may categorise them as
possessing definite traits as a tribe - "the X make very good boss-boys"
- a definition which will probably reflect the way in which the group was
incorporated, as a class or section of a class, into the labour force of
the capitalist economy. In these various folk definitions, from outside
of or within the group, the features selected for emphasis may be
primordial - that is, referring to apparently ancient tradition - but
whether these are genuinely, authentically traditional is unimportant.
Equally, but perhaps less frequently, the stressed features may be modern
- like the clothes and behavioural trappings of the Kalela dance described
by Mitchell - or may involve some kind of cultural reconstruction or
revivalism - like the prayers and religious meetings of Cohen's modern-day
Hausa mystics.
A case-study of ethnicity
In the case of Ndebele and Pedi in Morotse village, one may observe many
of the sociocultural means described by La Fontaine and Cohen for ensuring
group distinctivene.ss. Among these are residential segregation,
endogamy, and esoteric ritual.s My task now, however, is to look beyond
s
 The few ethnically mixed marriages that occur in Morotse usually end
in divorce, which informants explained by such phrases as "They are
not like us", "They have different ways", but also by citing the fact
that the two groups have different initiation rituals. Even if
intermarriage does not pose difficulties to the adult parties con-
cerned, it is when they have children, and when the time comes for
these children to be initiated, that the ethnic blurring involved
becomes most apparent, and most problematic. This is because a child
cannot become an adult without also becoming "a Pedi" or "an Ndebele":
the acquisition of such a status, for a child of either sex, involves
undergoing rituals the details of which which are secret to members
of other ethnic groups, but which are known to their own parents who
have been through these rituals to become adults in their turn, and
who may even have to perform crucial roles during the ritual process
of bringing their children to adulthood. But in the case of an
inter-ethnic marriage, one parent - the mother - will always be de-
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such mechanisms and to try and explain the origins and persistence of
these strong divisions, and particularly the strong cultural
distinctiveness of the Ndebele.
The appearance of this group in Pedi eyes as primitive, backward and op-
posed to civilising influences has a parallel - though with less deroga-
tory connotations - in the observations of anthropologists, who have seen
them as clinging tenciously to their original Nguni culture (see Delius
1987:1)-; White officials employed by the Lebowa and S A Governments to
run the agricultural Co-op, on the other hand, regard the Ndebele as in-
dustrious peasant farmers, who are down-to-earth and easy to communicate
with.
The fact that each group in the broader social field emphasises a dif-
ferent "typically Ndebele" trait is an illustration of Barth's point that
ethnicity is a situational phenomenon involving not absolute or objective
cultural differences "but only those which the actors themselves regard
as significant" (1969:14). In the case of the Ndebele, different features
are seen as significant by a range of actors, each addressing its own
agenda when interacting with the members of this group. It is only
through an examination of these various kinds of contacts in a historical
perspective that we may understand why such identifying characteristics
- sometimes so unlike each other as to be positively contradictory - have
been selected.
I start by examining the claims of anthropologists. It has been noted
that the Southern Ndebele, despite their close contact with Pedi people
over the last century and a half, have a social structure and culture
remarkably distinct from that of the Pedi (van Warmelo 1974:67, Schapera
fined as being outside of the group in whose rituals her children are
to be initiated. The process of initiation thus makes tangible her
exclusion from that group, and - in a way - from the very family she
has married into and helped to perpetuate.
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1949:206). Their language, form of initiation, descent groups and mar-
riage rules appear to be typically Nguni, and since the group is known
to have moved away from Natal Nguni territory during the 16th century,
it is thought that these features are Nguni traits which have been
tenaciously clung to.
What is problematic in this interpretation is its assumption that all
apparently traditional traits are necessarily Nguni survivals of the
group's Nguni origins. And even if one were to accept that these char-
acteristics do derive from the distant past, this interpretation begs the
question of what historical or contemporary circumstances have led to the
retention of these customs. This question demands an answer especially
urgently in the light of the fact that another group - the Northern
Ndebele - who shared the same Nguni origins and have lived close to Pedi
influence for an equivalent amount of time, did not retain Nguni language
or tradition in any measure.
A more detailed look at the attitudes expressed by Pedi villagers provides
some clues about the circumstances that gave rise to apparent Ndebele
conservatism. It is said that whereas Pedi are modern, civilised, edu-
cated and Christian, Ndebele prefer their customs, and this makes them
backward. Pedi are townspeople who understand town ways, but Ndebele are
country bumpkins. Proof of their primitiveness is their dislike of edu-
cation, and even when an Ndebele child does attend school, he or she will
leave as soon as possible: if a girl, she will never regard herself as
truly grown up unless she has worked as a domestic servant in Pretoria
for a few years before returning to build a house: if a boy, he will get
work so that he can buy an old car which will be parked in his parents'
plot and then left to rust. When going to town to look for work, the
Ndebele find jobs easily, because they will work for much less money than
a Pedi would. Also, they often do not have passes, which puts them in a
weak position and means that the employer can pay even less. A final
14
indication of their backwardness is Ndebele dislike of church, and their
favouring of traditional ancestor worship.
While some of these stereotypes - like the early age at which youths leave
school and look for work - are borne out by observation, others have no
referent whatsoever in present reality. Most notable among these are the
assumptions that the Pedi/Ndebele divide coincides on the one hand with
that between town and country people, and on the other with that between
Christi-ans and traditionalists. This stereotype in fact harks back to
contrasts beween Pedi and Ndebele when both were tenants on white farms,
and it is to this historical experience that we must now turn.
During the first few decades of the 20th century, members of both groups
were living on white-owned land in the Middelburg district and in
further-flung areas of the south-eastern Transvaal. For Pedi families
in this situation the proximity and availability of various alternatives
gave them a degree of choice in the tenancy contracts they entered into.
Firstly, although political autonomy was a thing of the past, there was
still the freedom afforded by having a separate and partly independent
domain, the limits and administration of which was to take many years for
successive governments to establish. Secondly, especially in the period
before the 1920s, the labour demands of different landowners still varied
widely, with richer farmers and land companies using some land simply as
"labour farms to house large numbers of rent-paying tenants, while poorer
farmers struggled in the face of this competition to retain even a few
families as labourers under arduous conditions. Thus when a Pedi family
did enter into a tenancy agreement which they found too heavy, or which
was altered after some time to increase the number of months' work to be
performed for the farmer, it was relatively easy for them to move - to
the Pedi reserve, to white-owned land which they could rent for a period,
or to missions or freehold Christian communities in the Middelburg dis-
trict. Even after the 1920s, when contracts became far more uniformly
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restrictive and less land was available to rent, Pedi were able still to
exercise at least the option of becoming labour migrants and thereby es-
caping from the conditions of farm work.
In contrast, the Ndebele were in a position to exercise far less choice.
After their defeat by the Boers in 1883, they had been given out to these
farmers as indentured labourers. Although the official period of
indenture only lasted for five years, and despite attempts made to break
free of the original farms to which they had been allotted (Delius
1987:8-10), these people still appeared, by 1914, to constitute a "trapped
labour force" (Morrell 1983:137). Partly, this situation of virtual
slavery derived from their extreme poverty - they were described by SNC
Edwards as being "as poor as church mice . . . they work for no wages and
going out to the mines is, to say the least, openly discouraged" (Morrell
1983:137). With minimal access to wages for farm or migrant work, these
tenants had no opportunity singly or as a group to purchase or rent land
which might have served as an independent residential or agricultural
base, and they thus lacked the options which allowed their Pedi counter-
parts some choice about the conditions under which they lived in white
areas.
It is argued by Delius (1987) that only during the period of indenture
did the Ndzundza - whose chiefdom in the 19th century had included a wide
range of heterogenous groups besides Nguni - forge a homogenous culture.
One response to the life of the farms, he suggests, was to attempt "to
regroup and to revive key social institutions like the homestead and male
initiation" {ibid:18), and that these socio-cultural reconstructions
provided the tenants with a template of a lifestyle beyond the one dic-
tated by the restrictive environment of the farms.
Thus, the alleged adherence to tribal ways of the Ndebele - and their
apparently traditional agnatic family structure - has its origins in the
16
farm era. While this family type may have been partly due to socio-
cultural reconstruction as Delius suggests, it also owed something to the
conditions of farm labour. A large family size was favoured by landlords,
and the stipulation that every member render service to the farmer, and
that failure to do so would result in eviction for the whole family,
prompted an intensified interdependence within the family. In addition,
the authority of male household heads, through whom the landlord issued
all instructions and demands for labour, was thereby artificially
bolstered.7 After resettlement in the Trust, continuing poverty and lack
of access to wider social groupings ensured a continuing interdependence
of family members, resulting in the survival of such extended families
into the present day.8
A further dimension to this creation of ethnicity was the fact that as-
pects of traditionalist behaviour - such as the wearing of skins rather
than western clothes - were positively insisted on by farmers, who appear
to have found the possibility of Ndzundza westernisation threatening to
their security in retaining this all-but-captive labour force. Along the
same lines, Delius demonstrates the farmers' reluctance to allow schools
on their farms, or even to envisage the possibility of their tenants'
children attending school elsewhere {ibid.:19-20).
And in similar vein, it seems unlikely that any church or mission activity
on these farms or involving these tenants would have been tolerated. In
contrast, many of the Pedi labour tenants on neighbouring farms came into
contact with Christianity early on: either through white missions based
within the nearby Pedi reserve, Trust areas, or Middelburg district it-
self; through independent African Christian communities living on
7
 See Morrell (1983:181) for historical evidence of these trends.
8
 This explanation is more fully detailed in James (1985:182-4).
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freehold farms such as that at Doornkop; or through migrants who converted
during their trips to town.
Through a combination of external constraints and indigenous response,
then, Ndebele identity came to be forged during the arduous years of
indenture and tenancy. This interpretation usefully illuminates the
modern-day Pedi ethnic stereotype of Ndebele villagers outlined above.
Although the Pedi view of Ndebele as heathens is not true of the present
time - there are roughly equal ratios of Christians to traditionalists
in both Pedi and Ndebele sections of the village - it is an accurate re-
flection of the era of life on the farms, and of the culture of both groups
when their members first began to arrive in the village in the 1930s.
One can explain in a similar light the Pedi stereotype of Ndebele as
country bumpkins rather than townspeople. When, during the first two or
three decades of the 20th century, Ndzundza were prevented from becoming
migrants by the constraints of their labour contracts and the lack of
resources or alternative accommodation which might have provided a basis
for relative independence, farm-dwelling Pedi were managing to combine
their tenancies with periods of migration to town, and were establishing
networks, finding places to live, and gaining a foothold in certain de-
fined areas of the urban/industrial economy.9 And although Ndzundza were
later to become as fully proletarianised as - albeit on less favourable
terms than - their Pedi neighbours, the Pedi stereotype seems to hark back
to the farm era in its insistence that Ndebele are primitive country folk.
At the same time, the aspect of the stereotype which emphasises the poorly
paid jobs that Ndebele are prepared to settle for once in town is an ac-
curate reflection of the fact that these people, when they did join the
ranks of the industrial working class, stepped into it at a lower and
9
 For an account of a similar process involving Pedi from a heartland
area, see Sansom (1970:71-4, 97-8).
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relatively less privileged level than did the Pedi. In this connection,
one can accept the claims of writers like Leys (1975) that ethnicity may
sometimes be a reflection of class position. The Ndzundza were unedu-
cated, lacked resources and so were "relatively disadvantaged within ru-
ral society" as Delius suggests {ibid:19). Their change of domicile from
white farm to Trust area had entailed a series of disadvantages: since
many came from further-flung areas they were unable to bring cattle with
them, and since most arrived after the 1950s they were unable to acquire
land in- their new abode. When they did begin to migrate to town for the
first time, they lacked ready-made urban networks and know-how, and
therefore were denied the possibility of getting jobs through friendships
within the urban context: all these things had to be built up from
scratch. Their class position was thus a lowly one in both rural and
urban aspects.
It is this past status of farm labourers which lies at the basis, too,
of Co-op officials' ethnic stereotypes of Ndebele villagers. In the
context of the Co-op, Ndebele are seen as good farmers who produce high
yields and who work with energy and enthusiasm on their fields, whereas
the Pedi prefer sitting around in offices to engaging in honest labour.
This excellence in agriculture, together with the "positive" initial re-
sponse by the Ndebele to the idea of the Co-op in contrast to the "sus-
picion" of their Pedi neighbours, is seen as dating from the long period
spent working for whites on farms. In addition, Ndebele are alleged to
have a better sense of humour than their Pedi counterparts, and are said
to be easier to get along with.
Interestingly, this view is the only one of the ethnic stereotypes men-
tioned so far which points directly to the experience of farm life as
being formative of Ndebele identity - but it does so in an upside-down
sort of way. There is little evidence, for example, that the experience
of labour tenancy made "better farmers" out of the Ndebele: plotholders'
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yields for the period 1979-82 indicate no significant difference between
ethnic groups, and members of both groups had lived as labour tenants in
the Middelburg district. Pedi ability to cultivate the soil while they
were on the farms would not have been affected by the fact that they were
freer to choose between farms and freer to migrate for part of the year
from an earlier period.
What can be more readily attributed to the effects of farm life is the
"easy communicability and good humour" part of the stereotype. The Co-op
officials are all white Afrikaners with experience of farming in the
district, to whom the idea of a farm labourer is synonymous with
"Mapogger" as Ndzundza are known in Afrikaans. Whereas many Pedi despite
their experience of farm life either cannot or - more often - refuse to
speak Afrikaans, most Ndebele acquired a good knowledge of the language
during the lengthy period of unmitigated tenancy. In addition, most are
well acquainted with many other aspects of Afrikaner culture, albeit from
the perspective of subordinates. Morotse's Ndebele inhabitants in the
present day seem to have an ease in interacting with whites, especially
Afrikaner whites, that contrasts markedly with the reserve and suspicion
of Pedi villagers, and that explains and partly substantiates the Co-op
officials' stereotype.
A further factor that must be remembered in understanding this stereotype,
however, is the fact that the Ndebele with whom these officials have most
contact, and whose sense of humour they are thus best placed to appreci-
ate, are not in fact ordinary plotholders but rather members of the
chiefly family who occupy senior positions in the Co-op's administrative
hierarchy.10 Ironically, these men do spend a lot of time "sitting around
in offices" - in the Co-op office, to be precise - and it is here that
lengthy bantering sessions between elite Ndzundza and Afrikaner officials
10
 See James (1987:79-80) for details of how the Co-op administration
is tied in with structures of chiefly authority.
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are played out. The insistence by these officials that the Ndebele, as
seasoned farmers, readily took to the Co-op's introduction must then be
understood in a different light. It was these chiefly Ndebele, one of
whose number in fact devised the Co-op, that were keen to push the scheme
through. If ordinary, commoner Ndebele plotholders were supporters of
this initiative, and if they continued in apparent support of it even when
it was being roundly rejected by other villagers, this should be seen in
terms of the operation of chiefly privilege and authority in the commu-
nity, -and of the quasi-clientelist relationships between Ndebele
commoners and their chief, rather than in terms of a considered decision
about good farming based on years of experience working with whites. It
is these relationships that will form the subject of the following section
of the paper.
Ethnicity and authority
During the incident in which villagers grouped together to protest about
the interference of the Co-op in their farming, the ethnic stereotypes
which emerged - of Pedi as fighters and resisters in contrast to the
perceived obedience and quiescence of the Ndebele - were as inaccurate
as many of the other stereotypes mentioned so far. Despite some
informants' insistence that it was the Pedi villagers who initiated the
protest, voluble dissatisfaction about the Co-op had come from both sides
of the ethnic divide: a fact which reveals as false the officials' atti-
tude that Ndebele were overwhelmingly positive in their approach to the
Co-op. The stereotype seems more accurate however in reflecting each
group's behaviour after the meeting called by the chief to try and restore
calm to the village. Although the village had been more or less united
in its opposition to the Co-op, it was in responding to the chief's
emotive appeal for loyalty that its members appear to have divided along
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ethnic lines, into compliant Ndebele and defiant Pedi.1l It was this
split, in its perceived as well as its actual dimensions, which defused
the impact of the villagers' dissatisfaction, and which can throw some
light on how the issue of chiefly authority influences ethnicity in the
two groups.
Understanding Ndebele submission to the chief's appeal involves two major
areas of consideration. The first relates to the recent history of
chiefship and chiefly authority as experienced by the two sections of the
community. In contrast to the Pedi experience, in which there was a
long-standing tradition of chiefs being expected to voice their subjects'
opinions even when these brought them into conflict with higher authori-
ties, the continuity of Ndebele chiefly power was interrupted and even-
tually became re-established in a primarily ritual domain. The second
related aspect concerns the role of marriage rules in constituting chiefly
power and thereby ethnicity.
The defeat of the Ndzundza in 1883 left the members of this once powerful
chiefdom scattered on white farms without any form of effective leader-
11
 It might be argued here that Ndebele were compliant because it was
their chief who happened to be reigning in the area and who made the
appeal, and that Pedi villagers would have responded with equal
docility to a speech by a Pedi chief. It is true that there is no
effective representation of Pedi or Pedi traditional authority in the
area. The Bantu Authority system makes no provision for a sharing
of power between ethnic groups, and in this case it has designated
one chiefly position, to be occupied by an Ndebele. Although there
is a Pedi family of chiefly descent living in the village, the only
voice granted this family in the officially-recognised political
sphere is that of headman of the village's Pedi section. Almost the
only effective role played by this man is that of acting as a
mouthpiece to the community for decisions taken by the Co-op and by
agricultural functionaries of the Lebowa Government. In other words,
the village's Pedi headman like its Ndebele headman and like the
Ndebele chief of the area functions primarily as a messenger for di-
rectives from a sphere of influence beyond his own. To the extent
that these functions are effectively the same, one could measure and
compare the responses to ensconced authority by the two ethnic groups.
But there is a significant difference. The Pedi headman is subordi-
nate to the Ndebele chief and does not not enjoy the power - however
circumscribed this may be - which his superior can use to gain private
rewards within the Bantu Authorities system or to play the role of
patron towards his followers.
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ship. Despite this devastation of the polity, the imprisoned chief
Nyabela made great efforts to perpetuate his influence. According to oral
tradition, he sent messages to his subjects from prison and later dis-
patched an emissary to rule in his absence, l2 and documentary sources
corroborate that chiefly functions - most notably that of supervising male
initiation - were being re-established for Ndzundza on the farms around
1886 (Delius 1987:11-13). It seems however that leaders' power was to
remain narrowly restricted within this ritual domain, for all attempts
to regroup and to set up any more substantial material basis for inde-
pendence and political unity were thwarted (ibid.:17). A small group,
including a branch of the chiefly Mahlangu family, did live as rent ten-
ants on a farm called Kafferskraal where they were not directly subject
to the authority of any farmer. Nonetheless, the fact that most of the
chief's headmen and almost all of his subjects were labour tenants would
have placed severe restrictions on the operation of chiefly power in any
other than the ritual domain.
It is interesting that the issue around which the chiefship re-emerged -
male initiation - was also one of the few areas of influence in which this
revived power could be exercised. Although concerned primarily with
ceremony and ritual, it was not however an ephemeral aspect of Ndebele
social life. On the contrary, being one of the few institutions ensuring
unity in the otherwise disparate existence of these people, it seems to
have been loaded with several significances beyond its apparently limited
scope. Delius for instance proposes that by the 1920s initiation schools
were teaching youths the virtues of submission to the authority of the
male household head, and that this may have been indicative of the extreme
dependence of elders on members of the younger generation in the circum-
stances of labour tenancy where farmers wanted the whole family to work
on their lands. Values taught which would ensure the solidarity of fam-
12 See James (1987:44-7) for a fuller account.
23
ilies and thus the security of their tenancies on the farms were the same
values which supported and emphasised the importance of royalty, and in
Delius1 view the teachings during initiation may have reflected "a tacit
alliance between homestead heads battling to maintain their positions and
royals seeking recognition" (ibid.:19).
It is interesting to note that one area at least in which Southern Ndebele
culture does not display an apparent conservation of typically Nguni
features^ is that of the organisation of male initiation; the Ndebele
welat like its Pedi equivalent, is centralised and involves the congre-
gating of all youths of suitable age at the king's place, rather than
being run by the head of a local descent-group as is the usual Nguni
pattern (Kuper 1978:117-9; Sansom I974b:269). Although I have no infor-
mation about how long this has been the case, the use of the centralised
Pedi style in the context of farm life would have had the effect of fur-
ther stressing the centrality of royal and chiefly power.
It seems then that, during the farm era, the chief ship acquired a new and
fundamentally changed significance in Ndebele social life. While the
chief's authority declined in most areas, what remained of it became fo-
cused in the sphere of ritual, and especially in the ritual institution
for the education of youths. This in turn became the occasion on which
were stressed the virtues of loyalty and obedience to family elders and
to the chief himself. Being spread via such means, this ethos of loyalty
- albeit to a chief with narrowly circumscribed powers limited to the
domain of ritual - may well have become widespread amongst farm-dwelling
Ndebele.
This situation contrasts markedly with that obtaining among Pedi in the
area, not only those living in the Pedi reserve but even those who, like
the Ndebele, were tenants on farms in the Middelburg district. In fact
this proximity of reserve-dwellers and farm-dwellers was partly why the
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Pedi tenant community maintained an image of chiefship in which public
accountability was so crucial. As already mentioned, the Pedi chiefship
despite conquest by and subordination to the whites during the 19th cen-
tury still had a geographical base in the heartland of the Pedi reserve.
This base, and the social constituency of reserve-dwellers that went with
it, was to provide the ingredients for a fierce resistance to the S A
Government's subsequent interference with the operation of chiefly power.
One manifestation of this resistance can be seen in Pedi responses to the
Government's attempts, pre-1950, to establish a chain of command from
Native Commissioner downwards through chiefs to local headmen. According
to Sansom, the system foundered through lack of community recognition of
these state-endorsed authorities. To fill the gap in the authority-
structure left by people's reluctance to acknowledge these headmen, local
groups of unofficial leaders called bashalagae had emerged by the time
Sansom conducted fieldwork in the 1960s. These men had the advantage of
being beyond the control of the Commissioner since their existence as
leaders was unknown to him (Sansom 1970:38-43, 53-5). 13
The most pronounced resistance of all, however, occurred at the time when
the Government tried to impose Bantu Authorities. Despite much suspicion
a system of Tribal Authorities was briefly set up, but it encountered such
hostility - not least from its own office-bearers - that it was soon
disbanded, its Paramount suspended and then exiled, and another member
of the chiefly family appointed in his place. As in many other such
cases, there was a split within the population of the Pedi reserve between
those willing to implement the system - the supporters of this new chief
- and those who followed the true Paramount (based at Mohlaletse) and who
13
 These leaders were most often migrants who had earned enough money
to buy a plough and so make a living by ploughing others' fields in
the reserve area. In addition, they often managed resources for ab-
sent migrants, and it was on this service that many other aspects of
their leadership were built up.
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were fiercely opposed to the system. The strength of resistance
throughout the whole series of episodes, which culminated in the riots
of 1957, suggests however that a very large contingent of reserve-
dwellers, including numerous migrants, were strongly opposed to the im-
plementation of the Government's plans. What is interesting is that much
of this resistance was voiced by, or even initiated by, members of the
chiefly class in Pedi society, not the least of these being the Paramount
himself (SAIRR survey 1957-8 : 72-6) . ll>
From the evidence cited here, it can be seen that for inhabitants of the
Pedi reserve chiefship remained an institution in which secular power and
control were still very much at issue. And although it might be thought
that farm labour tenants, living outside the reserve, would have been
fairly remote from these kinds of struggles, I found evidence to suggest
a high degree of contact between the farms and the reserve area. A number
of Pedi informants, for instance, told me that when their families were
living on farms in the 1920s and early 1930s a son would travel to the
reserve to undergo initiation there, usually accompanied by one or more
sisters whose duty it was to cook for him. Also making for easy commu-
nication - of culture, ideologies of resistance and the like - was the
fact that Pedi farm tenants enjoyed a relatively high degree of mobility
compared to their Ndebele counterparts. A family might move fairly freely
between farms, but also to mission stations, to Pedi-owned freehold land,
and to the reserve itself.
The later parts of this saga did of course spell a kind of defeat for
resisters, since those chiefs who continued with the support of their
subjects to oppose the new system were simply bypassed, and surrogate
"chiefs" were installed in their place. To this day the incumbents
and supporters of the Mohlaletse Paramountcy, eventually allocated
the status of a mere Tribal Authority in the S A Government's schema
in 1965, insist on the higher ranking of this chiefship, and are em-
bittered by the refusal of surrounding Tribal Authorities to ac-
knowledge its superiority (Delius 1980:356).
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In these debates and conflicts about the role of royalty in the contem-
porary situation, it was not merely commoners who made their feelings
known, but frequently chiefs who articulated these feelings. The idea
that a chief traditionally is expected to act as a spokesman for community
feeling is by now well accepted among anthropologists, thanks largely to
Comaroff's seminal article (1974). That this idea was current too among
Pedi villagers in Morotse was made clear to me by a number of informants'
vehement statements. One man told me about his expectations of royal
behaviour: a chief should not be a ruler who tells people what to do, but
rather a follower and a listener. He must hear what his people want and
act on their behalf, and if he fails to do this, the people will be en-
titled to fight with, or even kill him. This same man expressed his ex-
asperation and puzzlement at the fact that Ndebele villagers lack this
attitude towards chiefly power, and at the fact that "they just clap their
hands and say 'Mahlangu' when (their chief) speaks".
I have sketched a contrast between chiefs whose authority came to exist
primarily in a ritual domain, since they and their subjects lived in
circumstances which denied the possibility of any more substantive power;
and chiefs whose constituency demanded - and whose independent geograph-
ical base allowed - a retention of secular authority which led to poli-
tical acts of resistance.
Marriage rules
While the differing histories of the two groups might account for their
having evolved different kinds of relationships between leaders and their
subjects, it is questionable whether these structures and attitudes would
persist in the present day merely because of some anachronistic carry-over
of ideology from the past, even if this was the recent past. What makes
these historical influences effective in the contemporary setting, and
thus bolsters the loyalty of Ndebele subjects to their chief, is a strong
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and far-reaching network of kinship ties. This in turn owes its existence
to the specific marriage-practices in this community, or at least in the
group of plotholders which forms its core.
Rules governing marriage appear to be one area among many in which Pedi
custom has influenced that of the Ndebele. In place of the strict exogamy
typical of Nguni peoples, Ndebele custom as documented by Fourie favoured
cousin marriage, especially with the daughter of the mother's brother
(Kuper 1978:114). Remnants of an emphasis on exogamy can be traced how-
ever in the following aspects noted by Fourie: marriage is prohibited with
any woman who has the same isibongo as a man, that is, with a patrilateral
parallel cousin. Splits in families are explained as originating in the
wish for their members to intermarry while maintaining the observance of
exogamy. The expansion of the Ndebele tribe historically to include other
families besides the original five was seen by Fourie's informants as
having been a welcome development since it facilitated exogamy. And the
strict observance of hlonipha and dramatising of social distance between
in-laws during the marriage ceremonies are more reminiscent of Nguni
groups practising clan exogamy than of the customary ease and familiarity
of Pedi affines who are often already blood relatives (Kuper 1978:114-6;
Preston-Whyte 1974:205).
The recent and contemporary practice of these marriage rules in the vil-
lage of Morotse places more emphasis on exogamy than on the repeating of
marriage alliances over several generations which recurring cross-cousin
marriage would facilitate. Informants stressed this too: "You may marry
a father's sister's child, but it is better to marry an unknown person".
It is this practice of setting up new marriage links in each generation
rather than cementing already-existing ones which could account for an
impression I gained early on in fieldwork: in the core group of
plotholding Ndebele who arrived early in the village, virtually every
family has some kinship tie to all the others. More important for my
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present argument, almost everyone is related, at least by marriage, to
Chief Mahlangu.
The effects of this tendency towards exogamy are made still more pro-
nounced by the practice of polygyny, much more widespread in the Ndebele
than the Pedi village section, and especially prevalent in royal circles.
The current chief's grandfather had five wives, and his father had three;
and the fact that each of these was chosen from a group different from
the chief's own implies still further-flung ties of affinal connection.
My suggestion is that the ties of kinship are here acting to reinforce
the ethos of loyalty to royal authority described earlier in this paper.
It is a suggestion based primarily on a folk interpretation, for at least
a few informants offered the existence of affinal links to the chief as
explanation for this reluctance to go further with their protests against
the Co-op. Although it is true that some of the connections to this chief
established by marriage are fairly remote and might therefore be thought
not to carry much weight, some case studies seem to demonstrate the con-
trary. Lena Msiza, wife of a man whose mother is the sister of the chief's
mother's mother, was one of the informants citing her relationship to the
chief as a reason for her loyalty to him. Another case study demon-
strating the strength of these marriage ties to royalty is that of David
Mthimunye, a dedicated Christian. Despite his fervent commitment to being
a Jehovah's Witness and his professed antipathy to aspects of customary
behaviour such as traditional dress, male initiation, and the chief's
court and its pronouncements, he nonetheless insisted that his marriage
to a half-sister of the chief's makes it imperative for him and his family
to behave with dutifulness and respect towards the chief at all times.
This man played no part in the plotholders' revolt, despite his expressed
dissatisfaction about the Co-op.
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My observation about this tendency to exogamy and the effects of this on
relationships of authority of course begs the question of what lies behind
this tendency. My insistence throughout this paper has been that social
rules and structures arise or change in relation to concrete historical
circumstances. There could be several possible reasons behind such a
change, and these can only be speculated about here. It has been noted,
for instance, that the practice of "marrying out" can create widespread
alliances (Webster 1977:197; Preston-Whyte 1974:192). These, besides
their economic and more general social functions, may have a specifically
political significance. Gluckman shows how, in the case of decentralised
Nuer society, the presence of affines - and therefore of blood relatives
in succeeding generations - in groups other than one's own creates a check
to possible conflict and feuding between the groups concerned
(1970:12-13). But in the case of societies with definite political
leaders, affinal links between groups could become even more salient
politically. Much has been written on the significance of cross-cousin
marriage in perpetuating links between rulers and ruled (Leach 1971;
Bonner 1980; Delius 1983), but the important point is that such links,
to be perpetuated, must first be initiated, and this must happen via the
practice of exogamy at least in the initial stages of overrule (see Bonner
1980:91; Delius 1983:55). In the accounts referred to here, the giving
of wives to previously unrelated groups in exogamous marriage is initiated
by the dominant or conquering group. Similarly, it could be the case
that, among the Ndebele, the impetus came from royals to extend
marriage-links to diverse groups of subjects. If this were the case, the
trend might well have started while Ndebele were still living on the
farms, and its effect would have been to counteract the dispersal and
disruption of the era of farm life, and at the same time to ensure a degree
of attachment to royal authority.
On the other hand, it is equally possible that marriage-links to the chief
and his family began to be established by Ndebele commoners, and that this
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trend started after the arrival of these people on the Trust farms. In
the Homeland context, such links of affinity could be visualised almost
as links of clientage, the existence of which might have been thought by
commoners to facilitate favourable treatment during land allocation and
distribution of other resources.
The question of which of these considerations or influences affected
Ndebele marriage patterns must remain unanswered in this paper. But the
idea that these affinal relationships are parallelled by, or express,
relationships of a patron-client kind between Ndebele subjects and their
chief is at least suggested by some evidence I found. And this leads me
to look at a final, and perhaps the most important, question about the
causes behind ethnicity: what resources might the group gain access to
by organising itself along ethnic lines, and by clustering itself around
a leader who enjoys privileged access to resources? In other words', what
political functions, in Cohen's terms, ultimately underlie ethnicity in
the case being discussed here?
Political underpinnings of ethnicity
It is my contention, then, that ethnic solidarity in Morotse is grounded
in recent historical experiences of chiefly authority, and reinforced by
marriage-ties. The explanation must be further qualified, however, to
establish its truth in relation to this specific historical and ge-
ographical setting, since it is clear from a look at Ndzundza Ndebele in
their official Homeland that very different relationships have developed
between royals and their subjects. is
15
 Here, chiefs have been profoundly influenced by, and even brought into
line with, majority popular opinion. The royal family was at first
party to the 'independence" proposed by the S A Government, even
though no member was actually to be designated as Chief Minister.
But in the light of fierce and uncompromising popular resistance to
the proposals, the family has swung about to identify itself with
those opposed to independence, and some of its members have even been
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There must therefore be something very specific about the contemporary
context of the Nebo Ndebele which, added to the factors of history and
kinship, has made them so apparently acquiescent to chiefly directives.
Briefly, I would argue that the explanation lies in their occupation of
a Homeland inhabited and broadly controlled by another ethnic group, where
resources are scarce, and where competition for these resources has been
predetermined as occurring along ethnic lines by state policies far beyond
the ambit of villagers' control. In examining this complex situation,
it is as- important to understand villagers' perceptions as it is to know
the facts, since it is a group's idea of itself as competing, or as being
threatened, which in Barth's terms creates the conditions for its self-
definition - and definition by the other group - as ethnic.
Morotse's Ndzundza villagers, according to evidence provided by my
fieldwork, felt threatened in the context of Lebowa. Although the imme-
diate area is defined as an Ndebele Tribal Authority, its situation within
the Pedi Homeland was cited by a number of informants as cause for their
feeling insecure here. This feeling of insecurity has been engendered
mainly by the recent debates and conflicts over whether or not the Ndebele
as a whole were to have a Homeland of their own. If, as some rumours had
it, the Homeland were to be situated remote from Nebo and adjoining the
home of the chiefly family's other faction (as, indeed, it finally has
been), then Morotse's Ndebele feared they might be evicted from Nebo al-
together, or discriminated against if they decided to remain there. Other
accounts seeming to substantiate these misgivings rumoured that Ndebele
would be denied citizenship unless they went to KwaNdebele. At the time
of fieldwork in 1983, some Nebo Ndebele had been driven by these fears
to pack their bags and leave. On the other hand, if KwaNdebele were to
be situated on twelve farms along Nebo's southern border, as other rumours
detained in official attempts to silence them as voicers of protest.
See James (1987) for a fuller account.
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predicted,1S then the possibility existed that the Nebo Trust farms
themselves, including Morotse and other villages, could be designated as
part of KwaNdebele. This might be thought to be reassuring to Ndebele
villagers, but their fear was that Pedi villagers would feel threatened
by and resentful of the change, since it would leave them entirely under
Ndebele control. And even though this was merely a vaguely projected
future possibility in 1982, the sense of threat, resentment and general
ethnic conflict engendered by it had already found its way into present
relationships between the village's two groups.
In addition to these Ndzundza perceptions of possible Pedi resentment
fuelled by developments yet to happen, there were very real and immediate
complaints from Pedi villagers about unfair allocation of resources along
ethnic lines. The chief and his henchmen are said to have favoured
Ndebele in giving them fields before Pedi who were ahead in the queue,
in allocating them larger residential stands, in deciding where to site
water taps, in building the high school in a place close to the chief's
own village where only Ndebele people live. There are also accusations
that the chief's relatives, who hold important positions in the Co-op,
have distributed plotholders' bags of mealies, and even food and fodder
sent by aid organisations- as famine relief, to other elite Ndebele in the
area, some of whom are said to have profited from the exchange by selling
these supplies from their shops. For these kinds of reasons, resentment
about the fact of Ndebele control in the local context is widespread in
the Pedi section of the village.17
16
 See James (1987:56-7) for an account of the controversy over the
Homeland's situation.
17
 The sense of outrage at the unfair partitioning of land, funds and
aid is engendered by a situation of scarce resources and strong
ethnicity, but it is also, of course, a product of the conduct of this
particular chief. Although the kind of weakness and propensity to
corruption he demonstrates are not unknown in other areas, they were
not for instance shared by his predecessor.
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The fact that this sense of ethnic tension has developed recently, and
specifically in response to an almost unbearable pressure on resources,
is indicated by opinions from both sections of the village. Pedi and
Ndebele informants concurred that they had coexisted harmoniously when
living side-by-side during the era when both were labour tenants. The
early years in Morotse, too, had seen the two groups living together
peacefully. One informant said that "it was only when so many people
began to arrive here that things became 'hot1 , and Pedi and Ndebele
started to fight one another".
The newcomers are almost all Ndebele, who have been moving off farms from
more and more far-flung parts of the eastern Transvaal. These people do
not share the links of kinship or loyalty which I have described as
knitting the core group of Ndebele - those who arrived earlier in the
village - into a solidary "ethnic" unit. They are, nevertheless, unde-
niably "Ndebele" - an identification given much greater weight by the way
ethnicity is underwritten in the officially-recognised administration of
the area. By Pedi villagers they are perceived, not only as increasing
the pressure of population and the growing sense of being surrounded by
strangers, but also as augmenting the Ndebele segment of the village, and
thus the extent of Ndebele control. To Ndebele in the village core, this
sense of growing Pedi resentment increases their own sense of being under
threat.
It can be seen how this very stressful situation provides a fertile
breeding-ground for inter-ethnic conflict. Members of each group are
driven closer together, and further away from members of the other group,
by the sense that their hold over the most basic factors of their
livelihood are under threat. And paradoxically it is the Ndebele, who
appear from the emic interpretations outlined above to be deriving most
benefit from the ethnically-defined situation, who feel most under threat
within the broader context of the Pedi Homeland.
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To understand this paradox, it is necessary to look at' a new factor not
mentioned thus far. In looking for the material basis for a contemporary
stressing of ethnicity, it is misleading to see the ethnic groups con-
cerned as internally homogenous and undifferentiated wholes which act in
terms of single uniting interests. There is, in fact, a fundamental
distinction in each group between a small elite and a large mass of or-
dinary working people. In the case of the Ndebele group, the fact that
it has been designated as being in control of the area and its resources
means, in effect, that members of the elite - the chief, members of his
close family who hold key positions in the tribal office and Co-op, in-
fluential shopkeepers, coal-merchants, and the like - exercise a hold over
some of these things. Although this hold over resources is a tenuous and
strictly circumscribed one, it is nevertheless significant in the context
of local-level relationships in the village. Ndebele ascendance in the
area thus amounts to little more than the provision of privileges for a
few of the group's leaders. It may be, as I have already suggested, that
the mass of ordinary Ndebele villagers attempt to establish their alle-
giance to these leaders, and to the chief in particular, in order to try
and ensure that they will be favoured in turn. Their identity as Ndebele
on its own by no means guarantees priority in the allocation of resources,
but their links to the chief - of marriage or merely of loyalty - might
be thought to do so.
My argument, restated, runs like this. A limited package of material
resources - land, funds, aid, buildings - exists, for the use of this
ethnically divided village. Although broader decisions about the dispo-
sition of these are taken in a sphere dominated by Pedi politicians, more
immediate control is in the hands of local Ndebele authorities. Ndebele
villagers, living side-by-side with their Pedi counterparts, sense a re-
sentment from them at the power exercised by these authorities. Given
the gradually tightening restrictions on resources, the effect of this
perceived resentment - and of the ensuing sense of being under threat -
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is to strengthen group solidarity, but particularly to deepen affiliation
to its ruling clique, in an attempt to reinforce and retain its members'
access to these key resources.
In this description of the village's Ndebele population as split by dif-
ferences of wealth, power and influence, we can find suggestions of the
existence of clientelist relationships. Although this aspect is merely
touched on here, and in my earlier point that ties of marriage to the
chief might well also be those of allegiance to a patron, it reiterates
Leys' observation that an emphasis on tribal or ethnic identity and unity
may serve to link members of different social strata in relationships of
interdependence, while disguising the fact that their interests are fun-
damentally opposed (1975:203). Here, Ndebele villagers form a solidary
group together with their leaders rather than grouping together with their
Pedi counterparts whose material situation resembles theirs so closely.
My suggestion, along similar lines to those argued by La Fontaine (1969)
and Cohen (1969), is that this group's definitive, apparently old-
fashioned traits are serving important political functions. In his case
study of Hausa traders in Ibadan, Cohen shows that not only is custom a
cloak for relationships of power and control over resources, but also that
it actually provides an idiom in which these relationships can be ex-
pressed. Things like an ideology of togetherness, opportunities to meet,
hierarchies of authority and structures of decision-making do fulfil
their ostensible purposes - which in Cohen's examples are kinship and
religious ones respectively - but they also act as an infrastructure al-
lowing for decision-making about and organisation relating to political
issues: in this case, control over long-distance trade in Nigeria.
There are important differences however between Cohen's Hausa traders and
the strongly ethnic Ndebele of my case study. It is true that apparently
customary features, such as links of kinship to the chief, and male ini-
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tiation schools, are here providing a blueprint for group solidarity and
for relationships which appear to facilitate access to land, funds and
general patronage. However the group is not organising itself
spontaneously along ethnic lines in order to seize control over an
available area of influence in a fairly fluid field, as the Hausa traders
were doing. Rather, the outer limits of the field are very clearly set
by the S A Government, and the fact that the competition for resources
in the contemporary era is an ethnic one is also preordained from above.
In addition, the group's leader has had his power augmented and arti-
ficially buttressed by the state's system of recognising a particular
chiefly line as "rightful" in any given area. In such a situation, the
opportunity does not arise for a group to organise itself in as flexible
a manner as Cohen's traders did, with all participants as fairly equal
partners in the enterprise. Rather, their political organisation in a
bid to secure resources takes the form of establishing and perpetuating
their allegiance and subordination to a ruler who, since his power is
guaranteed him by the system, is one of the only actors in the entire
drama with a reasonably secure hold on the goods that everyone desires.
Another important thing to remember is that in this case the possible
rewards are extremely meagre and may not be forthcoming at all. But I
do not think that this inadequacy of return would lessen the tenacity with
which people cling to such relationships of dependency.
There is one last point I wish to make about different degrees of for-
mality in ethnic organisation. Writings on the colonial period saw
ethnicity as having been encouraged or even newly created by the imposed
capitalist economy (Leys 1975:199) and/or by the colonial authorities in
their attempts to construct a system of administration for the colonies
(Gulliver 1969:13; Iliffe 1979:326-8). It was only after independence,
once these divisions were no longer officially enforced or recognised,
that they began to acquire their own volition. Groups now began of their
own accord to organise themselves along ethnic lines in a bid to gain or
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retain control over key resources (Cohen 1969:13-4, 184; La Fontaine
1969:182).
The trajectory followed by the Ndzundza Ndebele has been almost exactly
the opposite. Up until very recently the group has had no official re-
cognition at all, and even when state policy about African administration
had begun to adopt the idea of ethnic separation as its keystone the
Ndebele were still being accommodated alongside members of other groups
in different Homelands. The era of Ndebele indenture, labour tenancy and
its immediate aftermath thus produced its own spontaneous and
internally-generated group identity and solidarity, along some of the
lines suggested earlier. It is only more recently that this organic
growth of ethnic awareness has begun to be moulded by state policy, and
has assumed the rigid dimensions I have outlined here. One can only
speculate about whether this strong ethnicity would fade away if the of-
ficial policy of ethnic separation to be abandoned.
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